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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------
F UJYD f,. 11.l\RMSTON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Supreme Court No. 19297 
vs. 
T. R. HARMSTON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
l'ATURE OF THE CASE 
On October 2, 1980, plaintiff Floyd E. Harmston deeded a 
ciaincier interest in certain mineral rights to his brother, T. 
R. Ha1mston, the defendant/respondent. Plaintiff seeks to have 
said deeds cancelled. Respondent seeks to have title quieted in 
his name. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found plaintiff's contentions to be without 
rn,rit and ordered title to the mineral interests in question 
quieted in respondent pursuant to the deeds of October 2, 1980. 
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Rvspnndr_·nt :l t_::ks lo ha\·c the J\1, _J1 ·r1t <)f the t ri ,-=il l'<'tJt-t 
a ff i n"''J. 
S1Al1Mf.NT Of FACTS 
Plaintiff, ("Nick") H'cil!l1SlOn, ,jfld 
rlefendant/rcspon,:.·nt T. R. ( "Tc•d") JJ.,1111slnn, .n-e IHul lrc'l-s, who 
prior to October 12, 1980, c,l"·ays had a 'cJ"'od r01.-,ti1-.ncchip (Se:e 
Transcript, 2r_.{ J 97' l i n (• s 2 0 - _ 5 ) . 
,::. I J t , 
1lc. 
f .1mi ly to 
l_ne l:' 
ot !1:;, , .... ·n, 
oh. 
r, 1 c L, 1orc 
question, -:inci r1 1_,r•? 
action ·d 
1 C , <- n a . ' c r. ' .:T it , 
to r ( l1...''._- C\'t-' l t to 
RoosL'velt attorn0y, 
{1 f t t- t l l Cl i n t i f f I S 
t t12n two 
th2n 3 .. 
2 1-l c ''tl 
t ll r 
t 1 I ' n I l 3) 1r.n 
t 
I "0 ( - .r 
:- c 1 ( (;' LSC r l ) 'L ' 
'(· c il':"'l ·'· ; -" 
- l_ '1·2 ': h 1 } '"' , _- l:" ' c 
' ·i r-: r. h l I ,·:.'r 
( 2) years a f tc> r the conVt__"yance in 
.or nr' l'liv-ht-=ilf ( l/ 2) a f te>r th] s 
, (l.Cit ) (in, <-:: (J e 8' 
J T 1 • l_ : , --- c. r y ch 
: .'""JI ': -_j c , ·,t ! - t : 1._-t ?1 l r.cd 
- - l l 
i f ; (. nt 
l i n1ic:d that i.-.1 C:trm brotherly relationship, which had 
1,,,\,·1i;,1·d ll1<'m all 
'"'' 20 tii1·migh page 
of their lives (See Transcript, page 197 
198, line 5). Other than one sister, 
plaintiff's closest living relative (See 
:1 11'.·<·ript, ['age 196 Jinrs 16-21). 
ince the death of his wife. 
Plaintiff has not remarried 
In September 1980, plaintiff decided to give defendant a 
1 ( 111.J i nrl.er interest in certain of his mineral rights, while 
r·etaining a life estate for himself. To accomplish this result, 
consulted his attorney, Dennis L. Draney (See 
:, 0 e 6 9, 1 i r1" s 11-18) . tlr. C0siring to rr,ake 
'T1 I C: t hi S c J 
"· ·i 1 C; in';:_ i f ·,_ o c; n e ·: nd : :.- _ nk Jt it, c::nd if 
n t i \, a s s u re tho. t he v. :..::. n t. e d to :1 r- o c ,_:- e d , ;:-_he n to b r i n g r . 
?Y r_'C.-"11 (Sc:e ,---;;_ :scrjpt, ,_ge 1E8 li:ie 19 
: e ], gal cescriptions approximately one "'Gek later and plaintiff 
·'·;Lc·d Mr. Draney to prepare the deeds (See Transcript, page 169, 
lines 7-11). On this occasion, Mr. Draney again cautioned 
·.',eintiff to be certain of ;;hat he ,,·as doing, and explained to 
1 r,c. i ff the legal ef feet such a con1·ey2nce (See ".'ranscript, 
c;e 169, lines 13-15). On a ':.hird occasion, which v:2s 
\he time Mi-. D1·aney preparPd the ciPeds and the date they were 
«xecuted, Mr. Draney met alone with plaintiff in his (Draney's) 
nffice to be sure plaintiff completely understood the 
, and if to coflvey the remainder interest to the 
-Jefendant, W3S plaintiff rca J 1 y t () rlo 
Transcript, 1 71' line 20 I1d(Je I 7 2, Ji ne 5 I. 
Defendant was usually p1csent when plaintiff visited his 
attcrney, because plaintiff did not rlrivc einrl r1cfPnri,,1nt p1,ovided 
plaintiff transportation for plaintiff (See Transcript, ['age 33, 
line 23 through page 34 line 5). Finally, on a fourth occasion, 
namely October 2, 1980, plaintiff returned to Mr. Draney's office 
and executed the deeds in front of Mr. Draney, who also served as 
,:he Notary Public (See Tr;,nc,L-i-ipt, page 173 1 ine 21 through page 
174 line 10). 
--.·Ji C 1 .:>t :::.1 low ),,-
,,_ l 1 --; 
ji:-.:::-:;;lf of t!-:c 
'Id t L-nt r,f i .. 
r,is ;,_,c,c, t • 176 L:,e 21 
page : 7 7 j _ ,,- 2). 
?l2jr::.1ff r.dd 0 -:riri1ng of the 
nctur2i oL•JEcts cf his 'Urty (See pc,ge l 72 
lines 1-5; page 187 linccs 19-23; and l''CJE' 177, line 23 
through page 178 line 5). 
3. Plaintiff desired to make a present conveyance 
of specific riincral r _hts for the L· fit of his 
·'-he ·:,:e .nscr-ipt, [;-r;,;e 173, f1L:S 
18-20). 
4. cc·1µl._c:.tel)' -1-:::rood the r1:,r_ure uf 
the pror-e'.·ed • 1 cr,, eolly 
irrevocable, and that c v.'111 not 
Transcript, page 168, lir,_,s ll-15). 




5. Plaintiff had aci<·quate time to consider, 
reconsider, and reflect on whether he rPally w,01nt ed to 
go ahead with the conv0yiH1CP (See T1,,nc;c1 ipt, p<1<Je 174, 
lines 1-4). 
6. No di scernable pressure was 
induce plaintiff to make the 
Transcript, page 170 line 15 through 
and page 171 line 25 through page 172 
being applied to 
conveyance (See 
page 171 line 5, 
line 1). 
7. Plaintiff completely understood what was 
happening, and that the conveyance was what plaintiff 
really desired to do (See Transcript, page 177 lines 
17-19, and page 187, lines 3-13). 
8. Plaintiff's execution of said deeds were of 
his own free and voluntary acts (See Transcript, page 
174, lines 11-15). 
At the time the deeds were executed, Mr. Draney was aware 
that the plaintiff had serious concern about his step-son, Howard 
Blumer's, apparent failure to account for how he was dealing with 
plaintiff's assets. Mr. Draney had been directed by plaintiff to 
make i.nquiries and prepare to file suit. (See Transcript, page 
167 line 14 through page 168 line 8). Still Mr. Draney testified 
that in his extensive conversations with plaintiff, plaintiff's 
jesire to benefit his brother was the chief motivating factor for 
the conveyance (See Transcript, page 172, lines 1-5, page 173, 
lines 18-20, page 187, lines 6-10, and 14-23). Mr. Draney was, 
at all relevant times, representing plaintiff, and not defendant. 
Mr. Draney had never represented defendant nor done any work for 
him, with the possible except ion of the assistance in the 
preparation of a will several years prior, but which event Mr. 
rlraney could not even recall (See Transcript, page 167, lines 1-
s) • 
After the mineral deeds were executed, notarized, and 
rPcorded, plaintiff and defendant remained on good terms until 
['laintiff was taken up to the farm house of George and Virginia 
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Houston to live (See Transcript, page 197, lines 23-25). Mr. and 
Mrs. Houston were close friends and relatives of Howard Blumer 
(See Transcript, page 98 lines 7-11). Despite defendant's 
requests to see or just to talk to his brother, Mr. and Mrs. 
Houston denied the defendant permission to have any contact with 
the plaintiff whatsoever (See Transcript, page 44, lines 3-24). 
While plaintiff was thus being isolated from society and from his 
brother, attorney James Hall was directed to draw up an affidavit 
from a draft apparently prepared by Mrs. Houston, attempting to 
retract the mineral interests conveyed to the defendant some 
eleven (11) days earlier (See Transcript, page 152, lines 1-5, 
and page 157, lines 1-2). Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Houston 
continued to keep the plaintiff in their custody and away from 
the defendant, which situation continued for two (2) years (See 
page 137, lines 14-15). 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABSENT FRAUD, DURESS, MISTAKE, OR THE LIKE ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO THE GRANTEE, A COMPETENT GRANTOR WILL NOT BE PERMITTED 
TO ATTACK OR IMPEACH HIS OWN DEED 
The rule in Utah and other jurisdictions, is set forth in 
Desert Centers, Inc. 356 P.2d 286 (Utah 
1960), at 287: 
Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable 
to the Grantee, a competent Granter will not be 
permitted to attack or impeach his own deed. 
A Granter of a deed is presumed to be legally competent to make a 
Page -6-
conveyance. Hatch Hatch, 148 P. 433 (Utah, 1914). The trial 
court specifically found that there was "No showing of 
incompetency on the part of the plaintiff" at the time of the 
execution of the deeds in question." (Findings of Fact No. 15). 
No· evidence of any nature was introduced in this matter that 
plaintiff was not competent on October 2, 1980, when he executed 
the mineral deeds in question. The test applied by the Utah 
courts in determining whether a Grantor has sufficient mental 
capacity to make a deed is: 
A Grantor is deemed to have been incompetent if his 
"mental facilities were so deficient that there was not 
sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the deed, 
its nature and probable consequences, and to act with 
discretion in relation thereto, or with relation to the 
ordinary affairs of life. Petersen v. Carter, 579 P.2d 
329, at 331 (Utah, 1978); Anderson V-: Thomas, 159 P.2d 
142 (Utah, 1945); and O'Reiley P.2d 770 
(Utah 1934). 
Plaintiff's attorney Dennis L. Draney, testified that on October 
2, 1980, plaintiff did comprehend the subject of the deeds (see 
Transcript, page 176, line 17 through page 177, line 8), their 
nature and probable consequences (Transcript, page 177, lines 9-
19), and their relation to the ordinary affairs or whole context 
of plaintiff's life (Transcript, page 177, line 23 through page 
178, line 5). 
In light of the presumption of competency, Mr. Draney's 
unequivocal testimony, and the finding of the trial court, 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing "fraud, duress, mistake, 
"r the like, attributable to the grantee," T.R. Harmston, in 
order to have the said mineral deeds cancelled or rescinded. 
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Defendant submits that there was not even one scintilla of 
affirmative evidence produced to show that the defendant acted 
fraudulently, misrepresented any fact, exercised a dominating 
influence over his brother, subjected the plaintiff to any 
' duress, or otherwise behaved improperly in any way. 
II. IF PLAINTIFF MISTAKEN AS TO DEALINGS OF STEP-SON 
WITH HIS ASSETS, SUCH MISTAKE WAS NOT MATERIAL, 
NOR ATTRIBUTABLE TO RESPONDENT. 
A. Step-Son Not Adopte£ Plaj_r::itiff Until Two Ul_ Years 
Plaintiff's recital of facts states that "the conveyance of 
he deeds in question had the effect of doprivinr_' plaintiff's 
.atural heirs, his adopted son and granclchi l 1-en, of a 
ubstcntial portion of his cst2te." Throughout his brief, 
adoµted son." 
efendant maintains that these references are highly misleading. 
On October 2, 1980, the date of the mineral deed conveyances in 
question, defendant, together with one sister, were the closest 
living relatives of plaintiff (Sec Transcript, page 196, lines 
16-22), and were th·-·refore, the "natural objects of plaintiff's 
1ounty. 11 Howard Blumer testifed that he was thirtPen (13) ye3rs 
>f age when plaintiff r,crried his but he only resicJed in 
Jlaintiff's home for a year ur two, except for summor visits (See 
Transcript, page 77, lines 6-24). The adoption took place in 
November of 1982 (See Transcript, page 80, lines 12 and 13), when 
Mr. Blumer was sixty-four (64) or sixty-five (65) years of age 
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(See Transcript, page 75, line 5). This adoption took place more 
than fifty-one years after the marriage, two (2) years subsequent 
to the conveyance of the mineral deeds, and eighteen (18) months 
subsequent to the commencement of this litigation. Furthermore, 
it took place after the plaintiff had been residing with the 
Houstons, close friends and relatives of Howard Blumer, for two 
( 2) years, during which time plaintiff was isolated from 
defendant and other family members. In fact, defendant was 
completely prohibited from having contact whatsoever with 
plaintiff (See Transcript, page 44, lines 8-24). Furthermore, 
even if we assumed it were possible to disinherit a person who at 
the time was not a legal heir, the court specifically found that 
pl;iintiff's conveyance of a remainder interest in his mineral 
rights to the defendant involved only a portion of plaintiff's 
estate and that by making the conveyance, plaintiff did not 
disinherit his step-son and/or his step-grandchildren (Findings 
of Fact, Nos. 19 and 20, and Conclusions of Law No. 7). 
B. Mistake 2!_ Fact Of Plaintiff Not Proven. 
Throughout plaintiff's brief, the assumption is made that 
there was a "mistake of fact" in the mind of plaintiff at the 
time of plaintiff's conveyance of said mineral interests to 
defendant. The alleged mistake is that plaintiff's step-son, 
lioward Blumer, was "stealing" plaintiff's assets. However, 
Dennis L. Draney, plaintiff's attorney, testified that plaintiff 
"was concerned that he had not received an accounting of the 
;,niceeds of the sale of his home in Provo, Utah, that his son was 
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handling, or his step-son was handling, and he also had some 
concerns about some savings certificates, whether he had those or 
where they were." (Transcript, page 167, lines 20-24). The 
plaintiff testified in his deposition that there were five (5) 
' house payments which he did not know what happened to (See 
Plaintiff's Deposition, page 23, lines 13-20; and page 36, line 
21 through page 37, line 3). Howard Blumer testifed that up 
until June of 1980, the monthly payments from the sale of 
plaintiff's house had gone into a specific bank account in the 
joint name of plaintiff and Howard Blumer (See Transcript, page 
_9, lines 10-20). But then, Mr. Blumer went on to admit that: 
When the account--ciy ncoir1e ·"·as tce>:en o: f o: _t and r-:r. T. R. 
:ut onto Lhe account, the house 
on it' _ 
on to testify that he had not embezzled those payments, but that 
in October of 1980, the five (5) payments that had gone into that 
'lew account were redeposited into money market certificates in 
joint names of Mr. Blumer and plaintiff (See Transcript, page 
90, lines 6 through 14). Elumer testified that he had a 
Power of Attorney to transact business on b,0 half of plaintiff 
(See Ti:c 1script, page> 102, lines 3-9). h'ith sz.id Jin\ -r of 
Attorney, Blumer handled all the papcerwork connected with the 
sale of plaintiff's home in Provo, Utah (See Transcript, page 80, 
lines 15-17). Mr. Blumer further testified that fol lowing the 
return of plaintiff to Roosevelt, llti.h, he did not have any 
Page -10-
discussions with plaintiff concerning what plaintiff wanted done 
with his assets (See Transcript, page 87, lines 15-18). 
Under the foregoing circumstances, where five ( 5) monthly 
payments from June through October, with no explanation, stopped 
coming to plaintiff's account, and Mr. Blumer, with a Power of 
Attorney to deal as he wished with plaintiff's assets, was not 
communicating with plaintiff as to those dealings, plaintiff 
could we 11 have had a "we 11 founded concern" as to what was 
happening with his assets rather than an "obsessive belief that 
his step-son was stealing from him," as plaintiff's brief 
characterizes it. The treatise Dobbs Remedies, (West Hornbook 
addressing the definition of mistake of fact, states the 
following: 
"The idea that a 
accord with facts 
for this purpose. 
mistake is a 
is at least 
state of mind not in 
a good beginning place 
One who acts, knowing that he does not know certain 
matters of fact, makes no mistake as to those matters. 
He is consciously ignorant and thus has no state of 
mind at variance with facts" (At page 718) 
In the case at hand, it is by no means clear that there was any 
mistake of fact in the mind of the plaintiff whatsoever. The 
fact that the monthly payments from the sale of plaintiff's home, 
without any notification to plaintiff, suddenly ceased coming to 
his account, with no explanation from the fiduciary party 
involved, would seem to be sufficient explanation of plaintiff's 
displeasure with such fiduciary, regardless of whether plaintiff 
actually believed embezzlement was taking place. On his cross-
Page -11-
examination of plaintiff's then attorney, Dennis L. Draney, the 
trial attorney for plaintiff asked: 
"and he (plaintiff) was mad at Howard for not having 
accounted to him; is that right?" 
Answer: "Yes, I think that's a 
of his feelings toward Howard." 
181, lines 9-12). 
fair characterization 
(See Transcript, page 
The court's Findings of Fact in this regard are amply 
support from the evidence. 
Findings of Fact No. 9: "For several months prior to 
October 2-; plaintiff's step-son Howard 
Blumer, was not communicating with the plaintiff as 
plaintiff desired. During this period, the said step-
son had a Power of Attorney from plaintiff, which power 
Blumer used to transact business for and on behalf of 
Fi :·:rios of Fact t:Q. iU: "8ecau:_:.:0 
cc1mur. mcy l,c..\· 
trans£<: .:ir·2 a 1'f0ture 11 interest. ::...:-1 
the 
cf lack of 
'.elt in 
rights 
Thu. it is probable that no mistake of fact was influencing 
laintiff at all, but rather, an understandable concern and anger 
at the failure of a fiduciary, possessing great power over 
plaintiff's property, to Account to plaintiff concerning such 
property. But one thing _5 absolutely cle2r. I" plaintiff ·<1as 
::iperating under a m' stake of fact, that mi stake· was tne scile 
responsi!Jili ty of Ho1 .,rd Blumer and not the defendant. 
C. Respondent r·,, e No No bad 
Faith, Nor Contributed To Of Plaintiff 
As previously cited, "absent fraud, duress, mistake or the 
like attributable to the Grantee," the Grantor may not attack the 
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validity of of his own deed. See Desert Centers, Glen 
A court of equity will not exercise the 
power to cancel a conveyance for a unilateral mistake against a 
party whose conduct in no way contributed to or induced the 
and who will obtain no unconscionable advantage thereby. 
23 Am Jur 2nd, Deeds, §156. In the present case, it is clear 
that the plaintiff made absolutely no mistake as to the subject 
matter of what he was conveying, as was the case with the 
Grantors in the cases of Wamble v. Mahoney, 383 P. 2d 26, 29 
(Okla. 1963), and Tillbury Osmondson, 352 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. 
1964), cited in plaintiff's brief. At most, the plaintiff was 
mistaken as to one of the collateral factors which may have 
induced the conveyance. The trial court made the following 
finding of Fact in regard thereto: 
"While some evidence was introduced tending to show 
that plaintiff may have had concerns that his step-son, 
Howard Blumer, was dealing in an inappropriate manner 
with plaintiff's assets, and that plaintiff may have 
been mistaken as to the nature of Howard Blumer's 
dealings with his assets, the court specifically finds 
that defendant did nothing to cause any such mistake 
and that defendant oid not attempt to influence. the 
plaintiff because of any mistake." (Findings of Fact 
No. Conclusions of Law No. 
Defendant submits that the record contains no evidence tending to 
show any by the defendant to plaintiff, or 
anyone else. Plaintiff's brief purports to show two examples of 
defendant's misrepresentation. First, on page 3 of his Brief, 
plaintiff quotes defendant's statement that "Howard has jumped 
the gun. Hell, it all belonged to him anyway," and, "I don't 
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know why he'd want to do that." De fend ant urges t hat th,, s e 
statements, either standing alone or in full C<llltFxt are nnt 
evidence of misrepresentations. However, plaintiff has taken 
these statements out of context. The context follows. 
Plaintiff's counsel in referring to a previous deposition, asked 
defendant the following questions (See Transcript, page 18, line 
24 through page 19, line 8): 
Q And go to the question that begins at line 23; and 
if you' 11 follow with me: "Did you ever have 
discussions with your brother, in which you told him 
that Howarrl was out to take his assets, or some of 
them? Did you ever tell him that?" And the answer is: 
"No, sir. That was his idea." Is that how you 
testifierl at that time, sir? 
J... .es, s i: . 
A Yes, i r. 
Q Then the next quest ion: "You never told him that?" 
And your answer was: "No, sir." The next question: 
"Did you agree "'ith him ;:hen he said that?" AnS'-'er: 
"Absolutely I agreerl "·ith him, when he told me what had 
ha['pened. I said, 'Howarrl has jumped the gun.' I 
saio, 'Hell, it all he longed to hie anyway. I Jon't 
kno"· 1d1y he'd ;;ant to do that.'" Is that ho;,· you 
testified at the time of your deposition, sir? 
A That's whal said in the dc>positic,n. never did 
speak to Nick before that. 
in plaintiff's bt1ei wc.s a quote from pla1ntitf's ,Jc.posit1un. 
(See page 7, line 26 thrnunh paye 8, 11nC' 
9). Ouestion of Plinntitf's crninsel: 
"\>'hat if anything 
signing the mineral 
did he tell ynu about 
interests to h1m? 1' 
reasons for 
Plaintiff's answer: "Well, as I told you, he 
cal le_d_ and-- told me--that Howard was going to steal 
everything that I had. So I got to thinking about it, 
and I thought, well, that's what he's thinking. I 
didn't tell him nothing. I knew what he was after." 
Even taken in a context most favorable to appellant's claim 
(which is not the standard for appellant review) the foregoing 
exchange is still no evidence that a misrepresentation by the 
defendant caused a material mistake of fact to exist in the mind 
of the plaintiff. Instead of defendant making the statement, it 
is plaintiff who is stating that he "knew" that Blumer (not 
defendant) was after his assets and that plaintiff was not going 
to tell him anything. What defendant allegedly said would, 
therefore, have nade no difference, because plaintiff "knew" what 
Hlumer (or defendant) was after. 
The parenthetical insertion in plaintiff's brief in the 
,:hove qoutation (See Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 3-4) is probably 
incorrect, and should have been (respondent's) not (Howard's). 
Otherwise the sentence following would not make sense: "I didn't 
tell him nothing. I knew what he was after." It was respondent 
who "called and told me and so logically it was to 
respondent that plaintiff was referring when he said "I didn't 
tell him nothing." In asking the question, plaintiff's counsel 
used "he" to refer to respondent. In his answer, plaintiff used 
"he" twice, and plaintiff's counsel admits the first "he" in the 
answer referred to respondent. It is inconsistent, and 
completely unsupported by the context, to argue the second "he" 
1n the response referred to Howard Blumer. This being the case, 
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the exchange can not be used to show respondent created a 
"mistake of fact" in plaintiff's mind, because at the time he 
heard the statement, plaintiff distrusted respondent's motives in 
making it. 
' It must be remembered that on September 16, 1981, when 
plaintiff's deposition was taken, the plaintiff was residing with 
George and Virginia Houston (see Plaintiff's _Deposition, page 4, 
lines 4-9), and had been since October 12, 1980 (see Transcript, 
page 137, lines 1-4). Mr. and Mrs. Houston were close relatives 
and friends of Howard Blumer (see Transcript, page 98, lines 7-
11). Defendant testified that from and after October 12, 1980, 
even past the time of said deposit ion, denied him any 
ontact with his brother (see Transcript, page 44, lines 3-24, 
nd page 139, line 24 through page 140, line 1). The attitude of 
:irginia Houston is illustrated by this exchange (see Transcript, 
. age 128, lines 6-20): 
Plaintiff's Attornev: I'm merely asking what she 
said to Nick Harmston at the time when she saw him, not 
what the defendant said or anything she 
The Court: She can state what she said. 
Virginia Houston: went down to Uncle Nick's 
motel room and he said, "I'm glad to see you. I've got 
some things to tell you." And "And I've got 
some things to tell you." And he said, "Howarc"s been 
stealing everything I've got." And I said, "I,o, Nick, 
there's been a thief but it isn't""Howard. ·:our bank 
accounts are in T. R. Harmston's name." Ana I said, 
"if you don't look out, they're going to have yourml 
rights, too." And he said, "Well, there's no way that 
they can get those." And then I had to tel 1 him: 
"I've been over to the courthouse andseenthedeeds," 
and that he had given-up his oil rights to Ted. 
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After a year's isolation at the Houston farm house, with no 
contact with his brother, and apparently being regularly 
subjected to such comments from the Houstons as those quoted 
above, plaintiff appears to have developed a distorted and 
obsessive view of his own brother. Plaintiff's testimony at his 
deposition reflected this. Defendant asks, who was using undue 
influence and perhaps duress on the plaintiff? 
III. NO EVIDENCE OF CONFIDENTIAL (FIDUCIARY) 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, 
NOR OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
In order for a deed to be set aside by a court of equity on 
thP ground of undue influence, the person attacking the validity 
of the deed has the burden of showing undue influence in the 
execution of the deed by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Grantee exercised a dominating influence over the Grantor. 
Petersen v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah, 1978). Plaintiff's 
position in its brief is correct that when a fiduciary or 
"confidential" relationship is proved to exist between the 
Grantee and Grantor, the burden shifts and there is a presumption 
that the conveyance may have been unfair which must be rebutted 
by the Grantee. However, the burden of proving a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship was upon the plaintiff, and plaintiff did 
not meet that burden. The trial court, who heard the testimony, 
saw the witnesses, and observed their demeanor, etc., made the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in relation to 
the issue of confidential relationship: 
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Findings of Fact No. 16: There was no showing that 
defendant had ever given business advise to plaintiff 
or otherwise taken any action from which the court 
could conclude that a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship existed between the parties. 
Findings _Qf Fact No. 17: The defendant never isolated 
the plaintiff, or in any manner exercised a dominating 
influence over him or exercised undue influence over 
plaintiff. 
Conclusions of Law No. 4: There is insufficient 
evidence to show a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant at 
time material herein. 
Conclusions of Law No. 5: The evidence is insufficient 
to show that the dEcfendant exercised any domir-,ating 
influence over the plaintiff or l11at the defendant 
undue influence over the plaintiff. 
The t.est for finding \·»hether a fiduc·:.ry or 
:celationship exists under Utah Law is set forth in che case of 
v. P:_a_S£o'SS"'.!:_, 710 (Utah, 1965). 
he Utah Supreme Cour= held th_t for a relationship to he legally 
it: 
Must be such as would lead an ordinarly prudent person 
in the management of his business affairs to repose 
that degree of confidence in the other party which 
largely results in the substitution of the will of the 
latter for hat of the former ir the material ma'. ters 
involved in the transaction (At I -ge 713). 
Kinship alone, even the parent/child relctionship, 1 s 
nsufficient of itself to snow a confidential 
v. Rasmussen, supra. Kinship coupled with undisputed 
evidence of affection, trust and confidence was still not enough. 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, supra. The Utah case of Atlrlerson v. 
159 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1945) invo]vec a suit 
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cancellation of deeds for undue influence. In that action, there 
was evidence of the following factors pointing towards the 
existence of undue influence: 






by deeds, substantially all of 
effect, disinheriting six other 
3. Mother was 86 years old, blind, and in failing 
health, and the conveyance was just a few months before 
her death; 
4. Mother was grieving considerably over recent 
death of one of her sons; 
5. Finding by the court that mother was a person 
\·ho cnLl}d h2\•e been easily imposed upon; 
r_.. 
'io.·ever, in the Utah Cour-t found that there was still 
u::icisnt e·.'1a2nce to snov.' ':.ho<? v:2s acting L!nder the 
"dominating influence of her son" and held that: 
"These ciL-cumstances alone are not sufficient to show 
"ndue influence. The plaintiff must do more than 
merely raise a suspicion. There must be some 
affirmative evidence to show that Richard did exercise 
------- -----
a dominatin_g_ influence over this_ mother and thus, 
in ice her her property. Anderson v. 
Th las, supra, at page 144. (Emphasis added.) 
As is dreomaticolly illustrated by fa.nderson despite the 
•Xistence of which night give rise to a suspicion 
of undue influence, the law requires that: "There must be some 
affirmative evidence to show that "Grantee 11 did exercise a 
dominating influence over "the Grantor" and thus, induce him to 
part with his property. Anderson v. Thomas, supra. In the case 
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at hand, the trial court from its privileged position found that 
there was not one shred of such affirmative evidence produced. 
Plaintiff's brief makes much of the fact that prior to the 
conveyance "Plaintiff and Respondent had recently been spending 
an unprecendented amount of time together." Wh i 1 e p 1 a inti ff 
points out that defendant may have only visited him five or six 
times in Provo, in thirty years, defendant pointed out that he 
usually had no occasion to go to Provo, but that he and the 
•laintiff would visit three to half a dozen times each year, 
c'J' hly in Roosevelt, as that was their home town. (See 
fr, script, nage 24, lines 2-9). Natur2lly, they ;1ould srend 
aor.c - 'lle tc after Fc:2:._-_.:rry or :,arch 1 (;( r - - l• l_, I 
moveo '>ack t.G Roosevelt. 
testimc of c<efendant tha'.: t:he pc:·tieE hc.d had an exce2 le:-it 
re la ti- hip c::..l their 11\eS until t:he Houstons took the 
plaint. up t:o their home in October of 1980 (see Transc1·irt, 
page 4C, lin<c 10 through page 41, line 23). It ...._·c.s olso 
defendant's uncontroverted testimony that: he did not give the 
plaintiff any business advise r _- handle any of hie business; 
[Rather, plaintiff, prior to Oct.ober of 1980, took care of his 
wn did his own hanking and filej his O\Jn income tcx 
.see i-ranscript, page lir.:2 1-23' J in period JL_y 
through September of l '!80, he did no-::hing to keep h. s brother 
isolated from family members, including Howard Blumer (see 
Transcript, page 191, lines 19-25); he did not keep the plaintiff 
from the Houstons (see Transcript, page 192, lines 1-3); and 
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defendant gave his brother no advise as to: what to do with his 
estate, (see Transcript, page 193, lines 1-3); nor how to invest 
his money, (see Transcript, page 193, lines 4-6) what bank he 
should use, (see Tran.script, page 193, lines 7-8); what 
expenditures to make, (see Transcript, page 193, lines 9-11); nor 
did he exercise any control over financial affairs of the 
plaintiff (see Transcript, page 193, line 21 through page 194, 
line 2). 
In the case of Gmeiner v. Yacte, 592 P.2d 57 (Idaho, 1979), 
cited in plaintiff's brief, the court stated that undue influence 
is less likely to be found where it can be shown that the grant 
1'2:J::, ')'.:)'[_ susgestion or cf Grantee (o.t 
In the instant case, the defendant testified that he 
cic r.ot our;9est that c:he plaintiff ought to leave any mineral 
rights to him (see Transcript, page 194, lines 3-5). In response 
to questioning from his counsel, defendant testified as follows: 
rue'°tion: "When you went to Mr. Draney's office 
the (irst time that mineral rights were discussed, had 
your brother informed you before you went there as to 
what the meeting would b& about?" 
; ns>.'er: "Yeah, he came up to the shop and said 
let'' gc.-l:!J 2nd see Draney about it." 
"What was yoL'r first introduction to 
the S'C:DJect?" 
A__i:i.s•'er: 'Yeah, well no. A day or two before that 
he came in. He says, "Johnnie" he says, "I've got 
these mineral rights up here in Leeton and I want you 
to have them." He said, "some day they' 11 drill on 
them and they'll be worth a lot of money and help you 
out." I says, "I'll be glad to get them. I could use 
l t •II 
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Question: "He called you "Johnnie?" 
Answer: "That's my nick name. The family--" (see 
Transcript, page 195, line 12 through page 196, line 
l). 
The, testimony of plaintiff's then attorney, Dennis L. 
Draney, was that the conduct of the defendant, who provided 
;:ilaintiff's transportation to the attorney's office, was very 
)assive. Mr. Draney even recalled defendant stating to plaintiff 
to be sure that what plaintiff was doing was what plaintiff 
really wanted to do (See Transcript, page 170, lines 10-14, and 
line 25 through line 5 of page 171). 
Finally, rlaint:' ff clecrly admitted in his thal 
1e defendant cxc>rcised no undue influence to induce convpyance 
f the mineral right 0 at issue; At page 9, lines 2 through 4, 
attorney asked the question, "Did your 
roti say anything to you ahout why you were signing those 
1mineral deeds)?" Plaintiff's answer: "No. 11 
Page 17, lines 11 through 23, defendant's attorney asked, 
"Did anyone force you to sign the deeds?" Plaintiff, "No." Then 
plaintiff's attorney asked, "Did your brother ask you to sign the 
deeds?" Plaintiff, "No, think so, he never. 11 don't 
think he asked me to sign them, no. nne way or the other." 
Page 21, lines 16 tr1rough 21, plaintiff's attorney asked, 
"Has your brother ever asked you to be included in (your will)?" 
Plaintiff, "No." Plaintiff's attorney, "Or receive any of your 
assets?" Plaintiff, "No." Plaintiff's attorney, "Did he ask for 
the mineral rights?" Plaintiff, "No, he didn't ask for ttivm. 
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just stole them." 
The case of Gme i ner v. Ya cte, supra, cited by plaintiff 
states that the court will look closely at situations where the 
recipient of a deed or bequest has apparently been responsible 
for alienated affections of the Testator/Granter from other 
members of his or her family; and such situation is further 
aggrivated if Grantee has isolated the Granter from all contact 
with family or with disinterested third parties (at page 64). It 
is clear from the testimony that, contrary to the conduct of the 
relatives of Mr. Blumer, defendant never isolated the plainiff, 
never took him into custody, nor in any way attempted to 
luer::.:e his opinion of his oti1er far-Lily (see 
1canscript, page 194, lines 20-23). 
c:,nc pointed out that a conveyance would be suspect if it 
appeared unnatural (at page 63). Here, plaintiff's own attorney 
testified that the plaintiff stated to him he felt he wanted to 
take care of his brother and that he had taken care of his step-
son and step-son's children (see Transcript, page 187, lines 19-
2 3). Plaintiff knew that defendant "could use" said mineral 
interests after his death and that Mr. Blumer had already been 
pro,,ided for and in addition, Blur:ier had "plenty of money of his 
ov,n so damn much more ttian I've got that there is no 
comparison." deposition, page 29, lines 10-12). 
Plaintiff's entire argument is based upon inference upon 
inference upon inference, etc., none of which were found to exist 
hy the trial court. There is no direct or indirect evidence that 
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defendant exercised a dominating influence over the plaintiff, or 
a legally confidential relationship existed between them. 
=v. INDEPENDENT ADVISE SUFFICIENT TO REBUT 
PRESUMPTION OF UNFAIRNESS 
I 
Even supposing that the plaintiff had met its burden in 
establishing that a confidential relationship existed between the 
parties, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unfairness in 
:he transaction, this presumption is rebutted by a showing that 
he Grantor received independent advise before entering into the 
o:ransaction in question. Matter of estate of Reiland, 604 P.2d ---- - --- ---- - --
1219 (Kan. , 19 8 0). 
found tnat undue influence is less likely to be fcund l'TlE"-'= it 
oe shown tnat disinterested advise ;:as sought and t.hird 
s were informed of Grantor's in'c:.entions t.ne 
conveyc.nce v-·as carried out (at page 64). Similarly, tne :act 
that a Grantor had the legal significance and consequences of the 
proposed conveyance thoroughly explained to him by counsel of t.is 
own choosing, prior to making the convey a nee in quest ion, has 
been held by the Utah court to be ver significant in its finding 
:hat a Grantee did not exercise a dominate or undue influence 
',Ver a Grantor. v. 401 P.2d 710 at 714 
(Utah, 
The court's Findings of Fact in this regard provide an 
adequate summary of the uncontested and unrebutted evidence 
relating to the extensive advise and counsel which plaintiff had 
received from competent counsel of his own choosing prior to 
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making the conveyance in question. These Findings of Fact and 
conclusions of Law are attached to this Brief as appendix "B," 
and made a part by reference to the same. 
Respondent maintains that even if this court were to find 
that a confidential relationship existed between the parties on 
October 2, 1980, the showing of advise sought and 
rec<cived by plaintiff from competent legal counsel of his own 
choosing is much more than sufficient to rebut any presumption of 
unfairness in the transaction in question. 
CONCLUSION 
Plair.ciff's appeal is based on conjecture, suspicions, and 
inferences from "facts" which the trial court did not find. All 
of the findings of the trial court are supported by substantial 
evidence. This court should affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
DATED this ;)7- day of September, 1983. 
ATTORNEYS DEFENDANT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
do hereby certify that on the day of September, 1983, 





IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 








Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. 
T. R. HARMSTON, 
Defendant. Civil No. 11,207-A 
This matter came before the Court for trial on January 17, 
1983, the parties appearing together with their counsel and 
witnesses having been sworn and testified and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises now makes this 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In this case, the Court is called upon by plaintiff to 
find the deeds in question were invalid due to mistake, undue 
influence or fraud and to order a reconveyance or quieting of 
title of the interests in the plaintiff. Defendant is seeking 
to have the plaintiff's complaint dismissed and title to the min-
eral interest to be quieted in the defendant. Pursuant to this 
end, considerable evidence was presented bearing upon the actions 
of both the plaintiff and defendant during the time in question. 
Having heard the evidence and after having reviewed the entire 
file the Court finds as follows: 
1. The plaintiff at the time of the transaction herein was 
olderly and very concerned with his affairs to the point of being 
"A 
soJC1t"•>ha t of a nuisance to his banker. However, there is no 
showing of incompetency on the part of the plaintiff at this 
time. 
2. During that period of time, the plaintiff was not 
cJnmunicating with his step-son and for that reason felt him-
seif Justified in making the transfer of the deeds to the 
r10 fL'ndant. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to show a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship between the parties and is insuffi-
cient to show undue influence by defendant to plaintiff. 
4. The Court finds that vhile plaintiff may have been 
to and 
t.0 
5. .:- '. cc-::s::io:-ied 
invol\·cs only a of estate ilnd that 
;laintiff did not disinherit his step-son and step-grandchildren. 
6. The Court finds the plaintiff had the benefit of ade-
counsel at the time he signed the deeds and further that he 
fully advised of the effect of the deeds prior to his execution 
.: "' .-:::: , ...-. ,., C" - ____ .... ·•'_•....;, :.he Cocrt no cause of 
uclion on the part of ;!lair.tiff ""d cisroisses plaintiff's claims 
further orders that title to the mineral interests in question 




DATED this of February, 1983. 
cc: Herbert W. Gillespie 
George E. Mangan 





HERBERT Wm. GILLESPIE and 
GEORGE E. MANGAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
BO 1-722-2428 
'.' 
FILED Appendix "B" 
DISTRICT COV.<ff 
UINTAH COVNTY. UTAH 
MAY 13 JlG: 
DOROTHY 
. a..Jf,{$1Ut{ R,£EPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD E. HARMSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. R. HAID:STON I 
De :.C:nOc.. nt. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 11,207 
c:.bove entitled matter cc.rrre on for trial before 
Honorable Judge !''chard C. Davic'son, on January 17, 1983. The 
was present and by his s=lorneys, James R. 
Eiack and Fred R. Silvester. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorneys, Herbert Wm. Gillespie and George E. 
i(angan. The plaintiff called the following witnesses who were 
!sworn and gave ·_estimony: The defendant Ted (T. R.) Harmston, 
II 
i/Verl Haslem, Howard Blumer, l;ark Cohen, Virginia Huston and James 
ilR. Hall. The defendant then called the ::ollo·.·ir.3 who 
,I , 
'I•' ere sworn and gave testimony: Dennis L. Draney and himself. 
ilPlaintiff further submitted the deposition of the plaintiff, 
!dated September 16, 1981, to which defendant objected, and the 
1 
court took under advisement. The parties rested, and the court 
'/took the entire matter under advisement. 
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The court being fully advised in the premises, and based 
upon the testimony of the witnesses,· the deposition of the 
plaintiff, and the entire file and records herein, does make and 
enter the following Findings of Fact: 
1. Plaintiff, Floyd E. ("Nick") Rarmston and the defendant, 
T. R. ("Ted") Harmston are brothers who had a good brotherly 
relationship all of their lives up to and including October 2, 
1980.· ' : 
2. On October 2, 1980, plaintiff executed mineral deeds 
(copies of which were introduced at trial as pl"aintiff's Exhibits 
"2" and "3") wr.ich conveyed to che defe:idant a ::-e:r.c.injer interest 
of u:.c.h, Oesc:-ibed in I::;}:hi.bits. 
3. Plaintiff has had no children of his own. 
4. ?lcintiff's deceased •·ife had one (1) child by a 
previous marriage, i.e., Howard Blumer, which child plaintiff had 
not adopted as of October 2, 1980, who was adopted by plaintiff 
in 1982. 
5. Plaintiff has not remarried since the death of his wife 
on June 5, 1979. 
'6. Subsequent to the death of his wife, plaintiff moved 
back to Roosevelt, Utah, and in February or March of 1980, 
plaintiff Roosevelt attorney Dennis L. Draney, to 
probate the estate of his deceased wife. 
7. From that time up to and including October 2, 1980, Mr. 
f'°"ey wa' plai""'"' 
I :I 
attorney, and did not represent defendant 
Page -2-
I 
r do any work for defendant. 
8. In September, 1980, plaintiff decided that he desired to 
gift to defendant a remainder interest in those mineral rights 
described in Exhibits "2" and "3w. 
9. For several months prior to October 2, the 
plaintiff's step-son, Howard Blumer, was not communicating with 
the plaintiff as plaintiff desired. During this period, the said 
step-son had a Power of Attorney from plaintiff, -which power 
Blumer used to transact business for and on behalf of the 
plaintiff. 
10. Bec2use of Plt.:;t1er's lack of plc:intiff 
:_-.ich:s t.o :.: 
11. In Sept:el'.lber, 1980, plaintiff cc.Ii"\unciated to his 
1 
altorncy, DEnnis L. Dr2ney, plc:nt:r=•s desire to tr?usfer a 




12. Attorney Dennis L. Draney consulted with the plaintiff 
over a period of approximately two (2) weeks, during which time 
plaintiff made at least three (3) visits to Draney's office 
regc- rding said p::-oposed transfe:::, and on at least one ( 1) of 
those visits, Mr. Draney did privately discuss t:he legal effects 
and consequences of such a transfer with plaintiff, outside of 
the presence of the defendant. 
13. Before allowing plaintiff to execute the deeds in 
I question, Mr. 
!I 
Draney satisfied himself that the plaintiff: 
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... 
understood the nature and extent of his property; had a correct 
understanding of the natural objects of his bounty; desired to 
make a present conveyance of specific mineral rights for the 
benefit of his brother; had an appropriate understanding of the 
nature of the proposed conveyance, (especially that it was 
irrevocable and that a will could not change it); had adequate 
time to consider, reconsider and reflect upon whether he wanted 
to go ahead with the conveyance; no discernable pressure .was 
being applied to induce the plaintiff to make the conveyance; and 
plaintiff really desired to make a conveyance for the benefit of 
: .. ::-c:.ber. 
;_:Jc.'n::iff 
i I r .::.11 • .. 
!recording in the official records of the county. 
ii 
for 
The cieeds were 
so !:"tcorGeC. 
15. l-.t the time of the transaction herein, the plaintiff 
µas elcerly and very concerned with his affairs to the point of 
being somewhat of a nuisance to his banker. However, there is no 
showing of incompetency on the part of the plaintiff at that 
time. 
16. There was no shm-:ing that defendant had ever given 
busines:c 2dvice t:o the plaintiff or otherwise t:c.ken any action 
from which the court could conclude that a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. 
17. The defendant never isolated the plaintiff or in any 
manner exercised a dominating influence over him, or exercised 
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' 
undue influence over the plaintiff. 
18. While some evidence was introduced tending to show that 
plaintiff may have had concerns that his step-son, Boward Blumer, 
was dealing in an inappropriate manner with plaintiff's assets, 
and that plaintiff may have been mistaken as to the nature of 
Howard Blumer's dealings with his assets, the court specifically 
finds that defendant did nothing to cause any such mistake and 
that defendant did not attempt to influence the plaintiff because 
of any mistake. 
19. The transaction in question involves only a portion of 
:I 21. j'.'1ai:.-::i::f had the benefit cf «:iE::;t.:o:te legal counsel 
1
at -:he ·,i; e he sc·,::-.ed :.he C:ceds zn:5 ::-·]::i.-iti:'.::' ·.·c.s £ully advised 
of the effect of the GEeds, R;-ior to thEir execution. 
22. ?laintiff's execution of said deeds were the result of 
plaintiff's free and voluntary acts. 
BASED on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes and 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. That the court .has over the mineral 
' . 
: lnt.erests :.:::;ue herein. 
2. The plaintiff at the time of the transaction herein, was 1 
elderly and concerned about his assets. 




time plaintiff executed the deeds in question. 
4. There is insufficient evidence to show a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant at 
any time material herein. 
5. The evidence is insufficient to show that the defendant 
exercised any dominating influence over the plaintiff or that the 
defendant exercised undue influence over the plaintiff. 
' 
6. While plaintiff may have been mistaken as to the nature 
of his step-son's dealings with his property, the def·endant did 
nothing to cause or induce any such mistake and did not attempt 
'· 
a of 
'::;laint.:ff's ec:tate and :::ha::: plaintiff did not disir,herit his 
€..:-:d/c:- his .. 
II 8 Plaintiff had o;dequate legal counsel and ir-.depenoent 
, i1dviO'e
0 
c-t the time he signed the deeds in question and that he 
!i 
ll
was fully advised of their legal effect prior to his execution of 
the same. 
11 
9. The deeds by plaintiff to defendant were properly 
cxecu:::ed ar.d duly ::ecorded in the offical records of Uintah 
1
:county, Stc.:::e 
![ 1 0. The 





the plaintiff to the defendant are not 
has no basis upon which to order a 






· 11. Defendant is entitled to have the mineral interests 
evidenced by:Exhibits .n2•.and n3• quieted in his name, pursuant 
1 
to his Counterclaim, and to have the Complaint of the plaintiff 
dismissed, no cause of action. 
let judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this _!j__ day of 1983. 
:._cy,·cd .·.s 
---- ?: 
! .. I: :__ 
°'I I , 0 I fl J/ . 
__L: , . '..:Z- i(_//:;, J::?.,.- - :_ . - ..:.L 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie __ _ 
Richard C. Davidson 
George E. Mangan 
11 ,I 
HERBERT Wm. GILLESPIE and 




to''"'Af< r,OUNTV. UTAH 
ttorneys for Defendant 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, utah 84066 
801-722-2428 
IN THE SEVENTH 
DO::: -:; .. ·--
BY ..1. llC'ilnEPITTV 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD E. HARMSTON, _. - ) 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT - : 1: .. : 
vs. 
R. HAPJ·'.STON, civil No. 
_ 11e 1€' en 




j1Black and Fred R. Silvester. 
oy 
The deferidant s 
'!'he 
<:.nd 
11 -jlrcpresen;:.e.:i by his attorn0ys, Herbert 1/m. Gillespie and George E. 
II Mangan. The plaintiff called the following witnesses who were 
I ,-.worn and gave testimony: The defendant Ted (T. R.) Harmston, 
i1verl Haslem, H01.·ard Blumer, Mark Cohen, Virginia Huston and James 
ilR. rlall. The oeien::Sant t.hen c2l!ecJ the follo;,·ing vitnesses, ·,·':lo 
were Bv:or:-n SiC:.Ve tes:ii:ony: 
Plaintiff further submitted the deposition of the plaintiff, 
dated September 16, 1981, to which defendant objected, and the 
court took under advisement. The parties rested, and the court 




The court having separately made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE and 
DECREE: 
1. The plaintiff's Complaint in this matter is dismissed in 
its entirety, no cause of action. 
2. The title to the mineral interests in question are 
hereby ordered quieted in the defendant pursuant to the deeds 
(Exhibits "2• -and •3•) executed by the plaintiff on October, 2, 
1980. 
3. D'Cf-::>ncccnt is ;;;·2rded costs in this matter. 
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